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An increasing number of empirical studies in animals have demonstrated male mate choice. However, little is known about the
evolution of postpairing male choice, specifically which occurs by differential allocation of male parental care in response to female
signals. We use a population genetic model to examine whether such postpairing male mate choice can evolve when males face
a trade-off between parental care and extra-pair copulations (EPCs). Specifically, we assume that males allocate more effort to
providing parental care when mated to preferred (signaling) females, but they are then unable to allocate additional effort to
seek EPCs. We find that both male preference and female signaling can evolve in this situation, under certain conditions. First,
this evolution requires a relatively large difference in parental investment between males mated to preferred versus nonpreferred
females. Second, whether male choice and female signaling alleles become fixed in a population versus cycle in their frequencies
depends on the additional fecundity benefits from EPCs that are gained by choosy males. Third, less costly female signals enable
both signaling and choice alleles to evolve under more relaxed conditions. Our results also provide a new insight into the evolution
of sexual conflict over parental care.
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A central focus of research on sexual selection for many years
has been to determine the roles and importance of male–male
competition and female mate choice in driving signal evolution
(Andersson 1994). However, it has become increasingly clear that
male and female sex roles can be dynamic and variable (Edward
and Chapman 2011). A large number of empirical studies have
documented male mate choice as being prevalent in many taxa
(for reviews, see Amundsen 2000; Bonduriansky 2001; Kraai-
jeveld et al. 2007; Hooper and Miller 2008), resulting in several
theoretical studies about the evolution of male or mutual mate
choice having been published during the last decades (e.g., Ihara
and Aoki 1999; Kokko and Johnstone 2002; Servedio and Lande
2006; Servedio 2007; Nakahashi 2008; Barry and Kokko 2010;
South et al. 2012).
Traditionally, the mating success of males is thought to be
limited by the availability of mating opportunities, that is, it is
thought that the male-biased operational sex ratio (OSR) con-
strains the evolution of male choice (Kokko and Monaghan 2001;
Kokko and Johnstone 2002). Significant benefits are required to
offset the potential costs of male choice, such as through obtain-
ing greater investment from more fecund females (Servedio and
Lande 2006; Servedio 2007; Nakahashi 2008), assortative mat-
ing according to female quality (Fawcett and Johnstone 2003;
Ha¨rdling and Kokko 2005; Venner et al. 2010), and a female pref-
erence for males that court them more vigorously (South et al.
2012). In such cases, males would make their choice before pair-
ing and copulation. However, fewer studies have examined the
factors driving the evolution of postpairing male mate choice; this
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may be even more common among populations than prepairing
mate choice (Ratikainen and Kokko 2010), because males may
be able to evaluate their mates after they have been accepted,
such as through certain physical contact (Edward and Chapman
2011).
One of the most direct strategies of postpairing male mate
choice should be the differential allocation of parental care
(Burley 1986). This behavior, which normally happens in fe-
males, has received abundant empirical support in different taxa
(Sheldon 2000), but males can also adjust their parental care
investment according to their mates’ ornamental attractiveness
(e.g., Burley 1988; Roulin 1999; Matessi et al. 2009; Mahr et al.
2012). Moreover, a number of empirical studies have suggested
that some signals expressed after pairing are intended to induce
higher investment of paternal care from the male parent; such
signals include avian eggshell pigmentations (e.g., Moreno et al.
2005; Soler et al. 2005; Hanley and Doucet 2009; English and
Montgomerie 2011), nest size (Jelı´nek et al. 2016), and female
feather carrying in the nest (Garcia-Navas et al. 2015). These find-
ings raise the question of why postpairing male mate choice would
evolve. Specifically, because reducing parental care may entail rel-
atively higher probabilities of breeding failure of their own nests
(Møller 2000), why would males adjust their parental care invest-
ment according to female sexual signals that are expressed after
pairing?
Normally, differential allocation of parental care is expected
to happen when there is a trade-off between current and future re-
productive fitness (Sheldon 2000). However, for many vertebrate
species, males could provide significant contributions to care for
offspring, while also investing energy in seeking additional extra-
pair matings (Magrath and Komdeur 2003). This situation allows
a trade-off between parental care and additional mating effort,
during the same breeding season (e.g., Magrath and Elgar 1997;
Symons et al. 2011). We propose that this trade-off, which has
been somewhat overlooked (Magrath and Komdeur 2003), has
the potential to influence the evolution of male mate choice for
female traits. Accordingly, we suppose that males exercise mate
choice by trading off parental investment with their current mate
with benefits from extra-pair copulations (EPCs). That is, males
may be expected to allocate more time and effort to seek EPCs
after they determine postpairing that their mates are nonpreferred
using physical contact or other sexual signals expressed by the
females.
To our knowledge, this mechanism has not been explored
or discussed theoretically or tested in the empirical studies listed
above. We therefore develop a two-locus, two-allele haploid pop-
ulation genetic model to explore the coevolution of the phenotypes
of postpairing male mate choice and a female signal. The signal
only affects the parental care investment by choosy males, who
carry a mate choice allele, while males without mate choice invest
without regard to the female signal. Furthermore, as a trade-off,
allocating more effort to parental care by males results in low-
ered extra-pair fecundity, because these males put less effort into
seeking EPCs. Unlike some previous studies (e.g., Servedio and
Lande 2006; South et al. 2012), the costly female signaling trait
is expressed after mating in our model. To avoid other selection
effects, we assume that this signal does not indicate the quality of
females, and therefore does not affect or predict the survivability
of females before pairing. This implies that the offspring would
not inherit alleles for high quality under male mate choice; our
formulations could thus fall under a “null model” (sensu Prum
2010) for sexual selection under this scenario.
We find that postpairing male mate choice and costly female
signals can evolve and be maintained in a population when there is
a trade-off between seeking EPCs and providing parental care by
the male parent. Interestingly, if the availability of EPCs for males
is high enough, both male choice and female signaling traits can
always be kept present through cycling, which deserves further
empirical exploration. Furthermore, we find that relatively strong
male preference is important for promoting the evolution of such a
system. The female signaling trait does not evolve if the changes in
parental care investment by males with versus without mate choice
are too small. A relatively low cost to the female of expressing
the signal also plays an important role in promoting signal evo-
lution, which is consistent with some empirical evidence. Taken
together, our results suggest a novel role for trade-offs in male
investment in driving the evolution of a mate choice and signaling
system.
The Model
Our modeling framework is based on previous models of mutual
mate choice (Servedio and Lande 2006; South et al. 2012) and
male parental care (Ihara 2002; Seki et al. 2007). As in those
models, we assume that generations are not overlapping and re-
production occurs between generations. The social mating sys-
tem is monogamy, and thus parental care is provided only by the
social mates. We assume that both males and females may en-
gage in EPCs, which only affects paternity. All females mate and
have equal mating rates. Males select their mates randomly in the
population. Furthermore, we assume no variability of quality or
condition (e.g., there are no “good genes”), thus concentrating on
the evolution of male mate choice without other selection factors.
In our model, we assume two loci denoted by P and S. Thus,
there will be four genotypes of P1S1, P1S2, P2S1, and P2S2. We
denote their frequencies by x1, x2, x3, and x4, respectively. The
allele frequencies of P1 and P2 are denoted by p1 and p2. Like-
wise, the allele frequencies of S1 and S2 are denoted by s1 and
s2. The locus, S, which is expressed only in females, determines
whether the female expresses the sexual signal preferred by males
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after copulation, such as egg color, nest size, and so on; S2 females
express this signal, while S1 females do not. Here, we assume that
such a signal entails a direct mortality cost to the female. Because
this cost is expressed after mating, and generations are not over-
lapping, it is manifested in the fact that nestlings will die without
the female parent’s care. Therefore, an S2female with the sexual
signal could only give birth to offspring and raise them success-
fully with a probability of 1 − t relative to that for an S1 female
(where 1 ≥ t ≥ 0). Selection on the female trait is thus manifested
as fecundity selection. Alternatively, we can also think of this cost
as the nest predation risk brought on by female signaling. The lo-
cus P is a preference locus that is only expressed in males, and
determines the male mate choice behavior. Specifically, a P1 male
shows no difference in parental care investment when he mates
with an S1 or an S2 female. However, a P2 male will reduce his
parental investment to 1 − δ1 when he mates with an S1 female
and increase it to 1 + δ2 when he mates with an S2 female, relative
to that for a P1 male.
Simultaneously, we assume each P1 male will gain fixed
fecundity benefits from EPCs in each generation, whereas the
benefits gained by P2males directly depend on the phenotype
of their mates. As a trade-off with parental investment, P2males
will sire more and less extra-pair offspring relative to P1 males
when they mate with nonpreferred (i.e., S1) and preferred (i.e.,
S2) females, respectively. Because the potential availability of
EPCs for males should not be unlimited in a population, if there
are increased numbers of males allocating more effort to seek
EPCs, the potential success rate of each male should decline due
to the competition. Therefore, the realized extra-pair fecundity
benefits gained by males should be frequency dependent. We
can assume that the maximum potential fecundity benefits gained
from EPCs by x j males while mating with xi females in the
population is Ci j = c + e1dc1 − e2dc2, where e1 = 1 and e2 = 0
if j = 3 or 4 (i.e., males have the allele P2) and i is odd (i.e.,
females have the allele S1), e1 = 0 and e2 = 1 if j = 3 or 4
and i is even (i.e., females have the allele S2), and e1 = 0 and
e2 = 0 otherwise. Note that dc2 should be smaller than c to keep
Ci j > 0. We use this maximum value to calculate the proportion
of extra-pair offspring sired by x j males with different genotypes,
that is,
ρx j =
x j
∑
i xi Ci j∑
i j xi x j Ci j
, (1)
and also assess the competitive strength for EPCs by males in the
population as follows:
ϕ =
∑
i j
xi x j Ci j . (2)
We assume a life cycle that begins with random pairing.
The number of surviving offspring (∅) is directly determined by
parental investment from their social parents: ∅ = 1 + bm (Ihara
2002; Seki et al. 2007). In ∅, the first term (i.e., 1) represents
the surviving offspring due to the care provided by the female
parent, while the second term (i.e., bm) represents the surviving
offspring due to the care provided by the male parent, respectively.
Here, b represents the relative effect of male, compared to female,
parental care on offspring survival, and m is the expected parental
care effort of male parent.
We can first derive the male parental care effort under each
mating combination of xi female and x j male according to our
above assumptions:
mi j = 1 − f1δ1 + f2δ2, (3)
where f1 = 1 and f2 = 0 if j = 3 or 4 (i.e., males have the
allele P2) and i is odd (i.e., females have the allele S1), f1 = 0 and
f2 = 1 if j = 3 or 4 and i is even (i.e., females have the allele
S2) and f1 = 0 and f2 = 0 otherwise. Subsequently, the final
surviving offspring (∅i j ) of each mating combination is affected
by the female’s mortality due to expressing the signal:
∅i j =
(
1 + bmi j
) (1 − kt) , (4)
where k = 1 if i is even (i.e., females have the allele S2), and
k = 0 otherwise.
Because both males and females will engage in EPCs, the
above surviving offspring matrix ∅i j should contain both within-
pair and extra-pair offspring produced by xi females. We assume
that males would select their EPC mates randomly among the
whole population, and therefore each female would have the same
probability of mating with extra-pair mates. Based on this, we
assume that each female in the population will have a proportion of
θ offspring sired by the social mate and a proportion of 1 − θ sired
by extra-pair mates. The realized fecundity benefits gained from
EPCs by x j males thus should be determined by the total extra-
pair offspring produced by females and the proportion of ρx j , that
is, ρx j (1 − θ)
∑
i j ∅i j .
We can expect that the proportion θ may be frequency-
dependent in reality. On one hand, if there are increased number
of males allocating more effort to seek EPCs in the population
(i.e., under more severe male competition, or say larger value
of ϕ), females may produce a higher proportion of extra-pair
offspring because of the more frequent EPC attempts by males
(Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). On the other hand, the pro-
portion θ may decline when the mating pair can have higher
fitness (i.e., have more surviving offspring, or say larger value
of w =∑i j xi x j∅i j ), possibly because of lower levels of EPC
pursuing behavior by females in the population (e.g., Pierce and
Lifjeld 1998) or more intense mate guarding by males assum-
ing females also trade-off EPCs with parental care (e.g., Wagner
et al. 1996). It should always be more beneficial for males to
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protect their paternity more intensively when the number of sur-
viving offspring produced by their social mates increases. For
simplicity, we first use the following arbitrary function to include
both the above-mentioned effects:
θ = w
ϕ + w . (5)
For generality, we also relax the above assumption about the
frequency-dependent function θ by using a constant for it, which
implies that each male would simply lose a fixed proportion of
1 − θ within-pair paternity. We get quite similar, but somewhat
more complicated results from the more general assumption (see
Supporting Information).
Male choice can result in a 4 × 4 matrix F of the proportion
of surviving offspring between each genotype, where Fi j includes
both within-pair (Fini j ) and extra-pair offspring (Fexi j ), that is, Fi j =
Fini j + Fexi j , where
Fini j =
xi x jθ∅i j
w
, (6)
Fexi j =
ρx j
∑
j xi x j (1 − θ) ∅i j
w
. (7)
Following the standard equations for recombination and seg-
regation for two loci in haploids, we can derive the recursion
equations for the genotype frequencies, and then convert these
into equations for the allele frequencies for S2 and P2 and linkage
disequilibrium between them, D. These full equations and de-
tails of the analyses are archived in Mathematica files on Dryad
(doi:10.5061/dryad.h422c). We calculate the equilibria analyti-
cally and determine the local stability of each equilibrium through
a linear stability analysis.
Results
CAN MALE POSTPAIRING MATE CHOICE EVOLVE
AS WITH A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN SEEKING EPCS
AND PROVIDING PARENTAL CARE?
Through calculation of the equilibria of the model and the cor-
responding stabilities, we find that both postpairing male mate
choice and female signal can evolve, given a trade-off for males
between providing parental care and seeking EPCs. The equilibria
are given below in the form of ( pˆ, sˆ, ˆD), where pˆ and sˆ represent
the frequency of alleles P2 and S2 at each equilibrium, and ˆD
represents the corresponding linkage disequilibrium.
We find, as expected, that all four cases of fixation of alle-
les at the P and S loci, (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), and (1, 1,
0) are always equilibria. To explore whether both male postpair-
ing mate choice and the female signaling trait can evolve and be
maintained in a population, we assess the stabilities of these equi-
libria (see Supporting Information SI1). These analyses indicate
that the equilibrium of most interest, (1, 1, 0), is locally sta-
ble when dc2 < bδ2(1 − t) and δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) are satisfied (see
medium-green and dark green regions in Figure 1A and C, and
see Supporting Information SI1). Therefore, both male choice
and female signaling can fix in the population when P2 males
have a relatively strong preference manifested through providing
relatively high additional parental care investment after mating
with S2 females (i.e., high value of δ2), but only given a lim-
ited reduction in extra-pair fecundity benefits (i.e., small value
of dc2). Furthermore, at the equilibrium (1, 1, 0), the P1 allele
will invade if the reduction in extra-pair fecundity benefits of
P2 males mating with S2 females (i.e., dc2) is greater than the
within-pair fitness increase of this pair in terms of the number of
offspring (i.e., bδ2(1 − t)). Likewise, invasion of the S1 allele can
occur if S1 females can produce a larger number of offspring than
S2 females when mating with P2 males (i.e., which will occur
when 1 + b(1 − δ1) > (1 + b(1 + δ2))(1 − t) – a rearrangement
of δ2 < (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) ).
The stability of the equilibrium (0, 0, 0) is only determined
by the relationship between the reduction in parental care b(δ1)
and the additional extra-pair benefits (dc1) gained by P2 males
mating with S1 females; that is, it is stable when dc1 < bδ1 (the
light green and medium-green regions below the oblique gray
dashed line as shown in Fig. 1; see Supporting Information SI1).
At this equilibrium, we can see that the allele S2 can never in-
vade because there is always a cost to this allele (i.e., t) in the
absence of P2 males. However, (0, 0, 0) can be invaded by the P2
allele, if the increase in extra-pair fecundity benefits (i.e., dc1) is
greater than the within-pair fitness reduction caused by reduced
parental care (i.e., bδ1) by P2 males mating with S1 females (see
the yellow region shown in Fig. 1). Additionally, there is a region
of bistability when both the equilibria (1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0) are
locally stable (see the medium-green area in Fig. 1A and C). In
this parameter region, the equilibrium that is reached will depend
upon the initial frequency of p2 and s2 (Fig. 2).
The equilibrium (0, 1, 0) is always unstable. When all males
have the P1 allele, the allele S1 will invade because the signal is
costly (i.e., t) but has no benefit. The allele P2 will also be able to
invade if the increase in within-pair fitness caused by increased
parental care (i.e., bδ2(1 − t)) offsets the reduction in extra-pair
fecundity benefits (i.e., dc2). At the equilibrium (1, 0, 0), the allele
P1 will invade if the increase in extra-pair fecundity benefits by
P2 males mating with S1 females (i.e., dc1) is too small relative to
the within-pair fitness reduction caused by reduced parental care
(i.e., bδ1). The S2 allele will invade if S2 females can produce
a larger number of offspring than S1 females after mating with
P2 males (i.e., when (1 + b(1 + δ2))(1 − t) > 1 + b(1 − δ1)). It
can be seen that the conditions for invasion in this paragraph thus
represent the flip side of the invasion criteria for the conditions
(1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0), as described above.
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Figure 1. The conditions required for local stability of the four cases of fixation of alleles at the P or S loci, and the existence of an
internal equilibrium. Regions indicated in light green plus the medium-green represent the conditions for the local stability of (0, 0, 0).
Equilibrium (1, 0, 0) is stable in the left yellow region. The region indicated in medium-green also represents the conditions required for
the local stability of (1, 1, 0) and the existence of a unstable internal equilibrium. In this region, there is bistability, such that both (1, 1,
0) and (0, 0, 0) are stable equilibria. The regions with dark green in (A) and (C) represents the conditions for only one stable equilibrium
(1, 1, 0). Regions indicated in blue represent the conditions required for the existence of cycling around the internal equilibrium. The
vertical dashed line shows the threshold value of δ1 when δ2 = (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) , the oblique dashed line is dc1 = bδ1. We set δ2 = 0.2 to enable
dc2 < bδ2(1− t) in (A) and (C), and δ2 = 0.1 to enable dc2 > bδ2(1− t) in (B) and (D), The other parameters are: b = 0.8, c = 1.0, dc2 = 0.1;
t = 0.2 in (A) and (B), and t = 0.1 in (C) and (D).
The model also has an internal equilibrium of
( (1+b)tb(δ1+δ2−tδ2) ,
dc1−bδ1
dc1+dc2−b(δ1+δ2−tδ2) , D
∗
in) (Fig. 1, and see Support-
ing Information SI1 and SI2), when δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) and ei-
ther the following condition set is satisfied: dc1 > bδ1 and
dc2 > bδ2(1 − t) (i.e., blue region in Fig. 1B and D) or dc1 < bδ1
and dc2 < bδ2(1 − t) (i.e., medium-green region in Fig. 1A and
C), where D∗in is the stable value of linkage disequilibrium (this
is calculated numerically for the following analyses). Using nu-
merical analysis to calculate the eigenvalues of the internal equi-
librium under different parameter values (see Supporting Infor-
mation SI3), we find that the internal equilibrium is always un-
stable, with eigenvalues larger than the unit. However, we find
that this equilibrium will have complex eigenvalues predicting
oscillatory dynamics when dc1 > bδ1 and dc2 > bδ2(1 − t) are
satisfied, that is, in the blue area of Figure 1B and D. Through
numerical simulation, we find that the allele frequency dynamics
will always develop into cycles around the internal equilibrium
with parameter values located within this area (Fig. 3A and B).
Therefore, in this region of the parameter space, both loci will be
kept polymorphic with oscillating frequencies in the population,
which implies that under relatively strong male preference (i.e.,
enabling δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) ), new mutations for a male preference
and a female signal will always be maintained after entering the
population, if the change in potential extra-pair fecundity benefits
(i.e., dc1 and dc2) are also great. Furthermore, we find that there
will always be a time lag between the two alleles’ frequency dy-
namics, that is, the allele frequency of S2 will still increase after
the allele frequency of P2 changes from increasing to decreasing,
or vice versa (Fig. 3).
Extensive numerical simulations show that the amplitude of
the allele frequency oscillation is smaller under lower recombi-
nation rate (Fig. 4; Fig S1). According to a magnified view of the
frequency dynamics as shown in Figure S3, we find that a lower
recombination rate enables the allele frequencies to cycle with a
shorter period. It can be seen that the linkage disequilibrium in-
creases and decreases more quickly under a lower recombination
EVOLUTION 2017 5
NAN LYU ET AL.
Figure 2. Numerical results of the bistable system with different initial frequencies of (p2, s2, 0), ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 with a step
size of 0.01. Regions indicated in black represent the population that will achieve the equilibrium of (0, 0, 0) from the corresponding
initial state. Regions indicated in gray represent the population that will achieve the equilibrium of (1, 1, 0). There are two red dots
representing the equilibria (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). The other parameters are: b = 0.8, r = 0.5, c = 0.9, δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.35; t = 0.1 in
(A) and (C) and t = 0.01 in (B) and (D); dc1 = 0.2, dc2 = 0.23 in (A) and (B), and dc1 = 0.15, dc2 = 0.2 in (C) and (D).
rate, which alternately causes the allele frequencies to change
from increasing to decreasing or from decreasing to increasing
more quickly (Fig. S3).
We also conduct analyses using a constant for the proportion
of within-pair offspring of each female (i.e., θ). For this case, we
give the detailed conditions required for local stability of each
equilibrium under a simplified symmetric situation (i.e., δ1 =
δ1 = δ, and dc1 = dc1 = dc ) in the Supporting Information SI1.
We get quite similar qualitative results in that both male choice
and female signaling traits can be maintained either at stable non-
zero allele frequencies or with oscillating frequencies (Fig. S2).
Additionally, although the conditions required are relatively strict,
both alleles can have a stable internal equilibrium, or say, achieve
a stable polymorphic state in this situation (Fig. S2A).
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF UNEQUAL CHANGES IN
MALE PARENTAL CARE AND POTENTIAL EXTRA-PAIR
BENEFITS AND COSTS
To obtain more intuition about how the outcomes of the model
relate to the costs and benefits of choice behavior, we next as-
sess the relative importance of the changes in male parental care
and potential extra-pair benefits and costs when P2 males mate
with S1 versus S2 females by setting δ1 = αδ2 and dc1 = βdc2,
respectively. This represents δ1 > δ2 and dc1 > dc2 when α and β
are larger than one, otherwise δ1 ≤ δ2 and dc1 ≤ dc2.
As the reduction in parental care given to S1 females (δ1),
increases with all else constant, there is a bigger and bigger region
where P2 and S2 cannot invade (light green, moving right Fig. 5A
and B). As the extra care given to S2 female (δ2) increases (moving
left on the figures), the model may enter a region where the only
stable equilibrium occurs when the alleles P2 and S2 are fixed
(dark green, Fig. 5B), that is, (1, 1, 0). This region also appears
when P2 males mated to S1 females get a large number of EPCs
(i.e., under a high value of dc1, Fig. 5C and D). So when either
type of benefit (dc1 or δ2) is very high, we obtain this region of
fixation of P2 and S2, and when in contrast, either type of cost in
the model (dc2 or δ1) is very high, the alleles P1 and S1 are more
likely to be fixed.
This way of parameterizing the model makes it clear that
obtaining (1, 1, 0) as the only stable equilibrium requires a rel-
atively small parental care cost/benefit ratio, that is, α (Fig. 5B)
or relatively high potential extra-pair benefit/cost ratio, that is, β
(Fig. 5C and D). Also, the fixation of both the P2 and S2 alleles
can be the only equilibrium especially when the mortality cost
of female signaling, t, is relatively small (Fig. 5B and D vs. A
and C).
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Figure 3. Frequency dynamics of two alleles under different initial frequencies when the internal equilibrium exists. Simulations are ran
for a total of 15,000 generations. The initial state is set to (0.1, 0.1, 0) in (A) and (C), and (0.5, 0.5, 0) in (B) and (D). The points shown in (A)
and (B) are the corresponding internal equilibrium of the model. (C, D) The frequency dynamics of the alleles P2 (red curve) and S2 (green
curve) during the last 1000 generations of (A) and (B), respectively. The other parameters are: b = 0.8, t = 0.1, c = 0.9, dc1 = 0.8,
dc2 = 0.75, r = 0.001, and δ1 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.25.
Figure 4. Frequency dynamics of two alleles and linkage disequilibrium under different recombination rates when the internal equilib-
rium exists. The red curve in the above figures represents the frequency of P2 and the green curve the frequency of S2. The initial state
is set to (0.5, 0.5, 0). (A) r = 0.5, (B) r = 0.1, and (C) r = 0.001. The other parameters are the same as in Figure 3.
Additionally, if the parental care cost of P2 males mating with
S1 females (δ1) is equal to zero, the population can only evolve
to the fixation of the P2 allele (with only the S1 allele present)
provided the potential benefit in EPCs gained by males in these
matings dc1 is positive (along the y axis in Fig. 5A and B). If, in
contrast, there are no available additional extra-pair benefits (i.e.,
dc1 = 0, along the x axis in Fig. 5C and D), the population can
still achieve the fixation of both P2 and S2 alleles under a quite
high value of increase in parental care from these matings (δ2),
provided that dc2 < bδ2(1 − t) is satisfied and P2 and S2 start at a
relatively high frequency.
LESS COSTLY FEMALE SIGNALS CAN FACILITATE THE
EVOLUTION OF POSTPAIRING MALE MATE CHOICE
For those two occasions shown above when both traits can evolve
simultaneously, that is, the existence of oscillations around the
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Figure 5. Representative figures of the relative importance of unequal changes in male parental care (i.e., δ1 and δ2) and potential
extra-pair benefits and costs (i.e., dc1 and dc2). In (A) and (B), we set dc1 = dc2 = dc and δ1 = αδ2 to assess the relative effect of the
reduction (δ1, when P2 males mate with S1 females) versus increase (δ2, when P2 males mate with S2 females) in parental care. In (C) and
(D), we set δ1 = δ2 = δ and dc1 = βdc2 to assess the relative effect of the increase (dc1, when P2 males mate with S1 females) versus
reduction (dc2, when P2 males mate with S2 females) in extra-pair mating benefits. The color definitions for local stabilities are generally
the same as in Figure 1. The regions with dark green in (B–D) represents the conditions for only one stable equilibrium of (1, 1, 0). In
(A) and (B), the oblique dashed line is dc = bδ1, the horizontal gray dashed line is dc = bδ2(1− t), the vertical black dashed line shows
α = 1− t, and the gray dashed line represents the corresponding value of α when δ2 = (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) . In (C) and (D), the oblique dashed
line shows dc1 = bδ, the vertical black dashed line shows dc2 = bδ(1− t) and the gray one represents δ = (1+b)tb(2−t) . We set δ2 = 0.2 in (A)
and (B) and dc2 = 0.5 in (C) and (D) for illustration. The other parameters are: b = 0.9, c = 1.0, t = 0.2 in (A) and (C), and t = 0.1 in
(B) and (D).
internal equilibrium and the stable equilibrium (1, 1, 0), we find
that the cost of female signal, that is, the value of t , plays a signifi-
cant role in facilitating the evolution of both male mate choice and
female signaling. Specifically, the condition of δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t)
is essential for both situations, and moreover, the local stabil-
ity of the equilibrium of (1, 1, 0) also requires the condition of
dc2 < bδ2(1 − t) (see Supporting Information SI1). Note that de-
creasing the value of t can effectively extend the regions indicated
by both of these inequalities (Figs. 1B and 5B and D). Further-
more, numerical simulations reveal that the population will evolve
to (1, 1, 0) under larger regions of the initial states with a smaller
value of t (Fig. 2B and D).
Discussion
Although recent empirical studies have demonstrated the presence
and extent of male mate choice in nature, little is known about
adaptive mechanisms of female signaling or how male preference
for such signal evolves (Chenoweth et al. 2006). This is particu-
larly true for postpairing male mate choice (Edward and Chapman
2011), which can directly affect female breeding success. In this
study, we found that postpairing male mate choice for costly fe-
male signals can evolve when male parental care investment is
high enough to substantially benefit both signaling females and
choosing (investing) males, even when these males pay a direct
trade-off by losing opportunities for EPCs.
Additionally, we find that these factors can interact to cause
trait and preference cycling (see below). This mechanism, which
is different from the previous hypothesis of differential allocation
(Sheldon 2000), thus provides a new reasonable way to offset the
potential cost associated with male mate choice (i.e., the lower
parental care investment of males that are mated to a nonpreferred
female). They also give insight to explain interesting phenomena
detected in the field, such as blue eggs in birds, which have been
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proposed to be related to postpairing male mate choice (Moreno
and Osorno 2003). We suggest that the main conclusions of our
study need to be tested empirically in the future, to further improve
our understanding of postpairing male mate choice in nature.
TWO WAYS TO GET MALE MATE CHOICE AND
FEMALE SIGNALS—FIXED OR CYCLING
PREFERENCES AND SIGNALS
In our model, both male mate choice and female signals can be
maintained in the population either by becoming fixed or by cy-
cling. Male and female parents each face a trade-off, which is
the source of cycling in the model. For males, there is a trade-off
between allocating effort to parental care and seeking additional
extra-pair matings. In turn, females expressing the signal pay a
fecundity cost, but they can induce social mates with the mate
choice allele to provide more parental care. We demonstrate that
under these assumptions both male choice and female signal can
evolve and be maintained in the population by cycling. Specifi-
cally, if the increase and the decrease in extra-pair fecundity, with
preferred and nonpreferred females, respectively, is high enough
to offset the corresponding change in within-pair fitness in that
type of pairing (i.e., dc1 > bδ1 and dc2 > bδ2(1 − t)), new mu-
tants for male choice and female signaling can be maintained
simultaneously through periodic oscillation (Figs. 1, 3, and 4 and
see Supporting Information SI). Note that in the case where fe-
males always have a constant proportion of extra-pair offspring
(i.e., 1 − θ), although the internal equilibrium can be stable un-
der restricted conditions, the cycling will persist under parameter
values in quite large regions (Fig. S2).
The observed oscillations are a result of frequency-dependent
selection involved in the trade-offs of gaining extra-pair fecundity
and providing parental care by males. According to our assump-
tions, each mating combination will have a certain proportion
of offspring sired by extra-pair fathers. Males will thus have to
compete to sire a limited number of extra-pair offspring, which
will cause negative frequency-dependent selection on any allele
increasing extra-pair mating.
Let us take a population initially dominated by P1 and S1
alleles as an example; P2 males will have higher fitness compared
to P1 males because they can gain more benefits from EPCs to
overcome their fitness lost within-pair (i.e., dc1 > bδ1, see ar-
row 1, Fig. 6). Then, as P2 males increase, S2 females will have
increasingly higher fitness because they will receive more male
parental care (i.e., from 1 − δ1 to 1 + δ2 by P2 males; arrow 2,
Fig. 6). When P2 and S2 alleles increase to certain frequencies, P1
males will then increase due to their higher extra-pair fecundity
benefits compared to P2 males when there is a high frequency of
S2 females. In other words, the fecundity benefits that P1 males
gain from EPCs will outweigh the combined effects of low EPCs
but high parental care of P2 males (i.e., dc2 > bδ2(1 − t), see
arrow 3, Fig. 6). Finally, because the S2allele is costly for females
but cannot bring additional male parental care when p1 is too
high, the S2allele will then gradually be displaced by the S1 allele
(see arrow 4, Fig. 6). Note that because there is positive linkage
disequilibrium between the P and S loci (Fig. 4), increases (or
decreases) in P2 will also tend to cause a modest increase (or de-
crease) in S2 due to this genetic association. This will contribute
to the shifts in direction of the frequency changes described above
(and also, as previously discussed, may contribute to the effects
of tighter recombination on the period of the cycles).
Interestingly, the evolutionary pressure of increasing extra-
pair fecundity drives two of the turns in this cycle. The first
step described above, the increase in choosy, P2 males when the
population consists of nonchoosy, P1 males and nonsignaling S1
females is due to the benefit of extra-pair matings. Likewise, when
males with the choice allele and signaling females predominate,
there are many opportunities for EPCs by P1 males that do not
invest as much, in a population of signaling females, in parental
care. The male choice allele thus both increases and is lost under
different population compositions by the same selective force.
The finding of cycling can provide a possible explanation for
inconsistent observations given by empirical studies. For example,
sexual selection has been proposed to explain the evolution of egg
color in birds, through the suggestion that males may adjust their
parental care investment according to the colors of eggs produced
by their mates (Moreno and Osorno 2003). Although this has been
verified in several bird species, the conclusions are still controver-
sial (Kilner 2006), and it is unclear why some studies have failed
to find empirical support (e.g., Krist and Grim 2007; Honza et al.
2011; Johnsen et al. 2011). Similarly, some experimental studies
found no or limited support for the ability of males to differen-
tially allocate resources, for example in rock sparrows (Petronia
petronia) (Pilastro et al. 2003), blue tits (Cyanistes caeruleus)
(Limbourg et al. 2013), and tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolor)
(Berzins and Dawson 2016). We suggest that the oscillating fre-
quencies as shown in Figures 3 and 4 may be a potential reason for
those inconsistent empirical results among bird species, because
male individuals with the mate choice allele may be polymorphic
in a population, and more importantly, the mate choice allele may
reach low frequencies during oscillations in some populations.
Therefore, we suggest that future studies of male differential al-
location behaviors and egg coloration should be conducted over
larger spatiotemporal scales to account for this possibility.
Additionally, both the female signal and male choice alleles
in our model can always fix in the population if the additional
extra-pair fecundity benefits gained by P2 males after mating
with S1 females is greater than the within-pair fitness reduction
(i.e., dc1 > bδ1), the increase in within-pair fitness after mating
with S2 females can offset the extra-pair fecundity benefits lost
(i.e., dc2 < bδ2(1 − t)), and the number of offspring produced by
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Figure 6. Schematic of the allele frequency oscillations when an internal equilibrium exists in the model.
S1 females is greater than that produced by S2 females that mated
with P2 males (i.e., δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) ). Even if the potential extra-
pair fecundity benefits gained or lost by P2 males are relatively
limited (i.e., with a small value of dc1), both the female signal
and male choice alleles still have a chance to become fixed in the
population, depending on the initial state of the allele frequencies
(Figs. 1 and 2). Under a relatively high initial frequency of the P2
allele, P2 males have higher within-pair fitness than do P1 males
when there are enough S2 females in the population. Although
the expected extra-pair fecundity fitness of P1 males mated to S2
females is higher than that of P2 males, it cannot compensate for
the lower within-pair fitness of P1 males compared to P2 males
when the additional extra-pair fecundity benefits are quite limited
(i.e., with small value of dc2). Due to a relatively large value of
male parental care with high δ2, S2 females will also have higher
fitness than do S1 females in this parameter range, which can
outweigh the costs of expressing the signals. Therefore, both the
male choice and female signals can be fixed in the population in
the parameter range shown by the medium-green and dark green
color in Figures 1 and 5.
We also highlight the importance of male parental care, which
deserves more empirical attention in the future. The presence
of a relatively strong male preference (i.e., with large values of
male parental care investment δ1and/or δ2) is essential for the
evolution of both the female signaling and male choice alleles.
This is especially true for the female signal, which will have
no chance to evolve when δ2 is smaller than (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) (Fig. 1).
This implies that in those species with male postpairing male mate
choice, males should have relatively strong preferences with great
changes in their parental care investment. Alternatively, in these
cases male parental care should play a relatively important role
in offspring survival, because large value of b can decrease the
threshold value of (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) (under a relatively small value of t
when t − δ1 < 1 − t is satisfied), and this then extends the region
of the maintenance of both male mate choice and female signals.
SEXUAL CONFLICT OVER PARENTAL CARE
Our modeling results give a new explanation for how sexual con-
flict over parental care can evolve through the feedback of sex-
ual selection (Kokko and Jennions 2008). Generally, each parent
should prefer to shift more of the costly care for the offspring
onto its mate, and then conflict arises (Trivers 1972; Houston
et al. 2005). It has been expected that sexually antagonistic co-
evolution between traits that function to increase care by the other
sex, and those that function to resist such manipulations, would
resolve such conflicts (Chapman et al. 2003).
In this study, we show that postpairing male mate choice
and female signals also reflect a conflict over parental care
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between the sexes. Males with mate choice would prefer to de-
cline parental care if they dislike their social mates, while females
expressing the signal can attract their social mates that have mate
choice to provide better parental care. The varied evolutionary
outcomes provide us a new insight into the evolution of such con-
flict. Specifically, if the change in male parental care investment in
a male’s own nest is relatively small (i.e., when δ2 < (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) ),
the signaling allele S2 will have no chance of being maintained in
the population, and moreover, all females will suffer from lower
parental investment from their mates if the additional extra-pair
fecundity benefits are great enough, because when dc1 > bδ1 is
satisfied, male mate choice and the loss of signal is the only
equilibrium (Fig. 1B and D).
However, if the additional male investment with preferred
females δ2 and/or the reduction of male investment with nonpre-
ferred females δ1 increase, which enables δ2 > (1+b)t−bδ1b(1−t) , both
the P2 and S2 alleles can be maintained in the population. Both
male mate choice and the female signal can then exist either as a
certain proportion of the population, that is, oscillating around the
internal equilibrium, or by fixing across the entire population, that
is, achieving the equilibrium of (1, 1, 0). As shown in Figure 2,
if the initial frequencies of allele P2 and S2 are large enough, the
equilibrium of (1, 1, 0) is ultimately achieved in the population
under some parameter values. Additionally, the male choice allele
P2 and female signaling allele S2 can always become fixed in the
population, as the only equilibrium, under certain conditions (see
the dark green region shown in Figs. 1A and C, and 5B–D). In
this situation, the conflict would be resolved in that all females
would express the costly sexual signal and receive increased male
parental care. In summary, relatively intense changes in parental
care by P2 males can enable the spread of costly sexual signals in
females, conversely attracting increased numbers of P2males to
allocate more effort to parental care.
THE IMPORTANCE OF A LESS COSTLY SIGNAL
For many species with heavily ornamented females (e.g., Hill
1993; Amundsen and Forsgren 2001; Domb and Pagel 2001;
LeBas et al. 2003), males could make their decision before cop-
ulation by assessing the quality or fecundity of the females from
their size or ornamentation (Chenoweth et al. 2006). Male mate
choice considered in this study occurs after copulation, which
means that the signal in females assessed by males should be
neither obvious nor intuitive in this case. The costs for females in
these instances should be lower than the signals that occur prepair-
ing, because such inconspicuous signals can effectively reduce the
potential predation risk for females and/or for nests, and then play
an important role in promoting the evolution of both choice and
the signal as revealed by our model (Figs. 1, 2, and 5). Based on
this, we can deduce that if the trait were to represent the inher-
ited high quality of females (i.e., as in a “good gene” scenario),
both male choice and female signaling will evolve more easily,
because the high offspring survivability brought by the inherited
high quality from S2 females can compensate to some degree for
the costs of the signal.
A potential example of postpairing signal by females is bird
eggs that have blue-green coloration, produced by the pigment
biliverdin (Kennedy and Vevers 1976). The expression of this
signal should be costly for females (Siefferman et al. 2006), due to
the fact that the accumulation of these chemicals in the shell gland
for coloring eggs may affect the antioxidant capacity of individual
females (Moreno and Osorno 2003). However, because this color
signal is expressed in the eggs, the female’s potential mortality risk
due to the expressed sexual signal should be lower than in species
with ornamented females, from the perspective of detection by
predators. Nest size has also been used as a form of signal by males
in the Great Reed Warbler (Acrocephalus arundinaceus) (Jelı´nek
et al. 2016), and has been indicated to have no effect on nest
predation or parasitism in the field (Jelı´nek et al. 2015). Moreover,
female feather carrying in the nest has also recently been proposed
to affect male investment (Garcia-Navas et al. 2015). This type of
low-cost sexual signal should therefore facilitate the evolution of
postpairing male mate choice behavior and female sexual signals
in those species.
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